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3(A)(10) FINANCING: NEW PREDATORY
FINANCING USING THE SECURITIES ACT
Thomas S. Glassman
ABSTRACT
The Section 3(a)(10) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 is meant
to exempt securities transactions where a fairness hearing by a judge or
government agency’s ruling replaces the usual SEC registration require-
ments. Recently, there has been a rise in 3(a)(10) financing schemes, where
a third party investor, what I call a “3(a)(10) financier,” will offer to
purchase the outstanding debts of a company from its creditors in exchange
for discounted, and unregistered, shares of stock.  In many cases these ex-
changes are done with no notification to current shareholders whose value
falls precipitously when the 3(a)(10) financier begins not only selling, but
through a common clause in these 3(a)(10) financing contracts, also de-
manding that the company issue more shares to them at any time.  The
companies who work with 3(a)(10) financiers have, in some cases, become
complicit in the scheme in order to hide these transactions from investors
who provide the liquidity for the 3(a)(10) financier sell-offs.  I conclude
that the SEC needs to provide updated guidance on Section 3(a)(10) as
well as bring significant enforcement actions to curtail this budding preda-
tory finance scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Section 3(a)(10) exemption of the Securities Act of 19331
(“3(a)(10)”) is meant to exempt securities transactions where a fairness
hearing by a judge or government agency’s ruling replaces usual registra-
tion requirements. Recently, there has been a rise in 3(a)(10) financing
schemes, where a third party investor, a “3(a)(10) financier,” offers to
purchase the outstanding debts of a company from its creditors in ex-
change for discounted, and unregistered, shares of stock. In traditional
stock issuances, a company must file a registration statement describing
the company’s properties and business, the security to be offered, informa-
tion about the management of the company, and financial statements cer-
tified by independent accountants.2 However, a 3(a)(10) settlement simply
requires that an action be brought against a company for “outstanding se-
1. Securities Act of 1933 §3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(10) (2012) (“Except with re-
spect to a security exchanged in a case under title 11, any security which is issued in exchange
for one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in
such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and
exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at
which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the
right to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any
State or Territorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority ex-
pressly authorized by law to grant such approval.”).
2. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURI-
TIES ACT OF 1933 (2011).
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curities, claims, or property interests” after which, in a fairness hearing, a
judge or agency must accept or reject the terms and conditions of the set-
tlement as “fair” to “all persons to whom it is proposed to issue the securi-
ties.”3 Those issuing the securities and those who already own the
securities are afforded no such protection.
This work explores the Section 3(a)(10) exemption in greater detail.
Part I discusses the background and history of the 3(a)(10) exemption.
Part II introduces the modern trend of 3(a)(10) financing for small public
companies. Part III discusses some of the harms of 3(a)(10) financing
schemes including who 3(a)(10) financing schemes hurt. Part IV discusses
the possible violations of 3(a)(10) financing schemes focusing specifically
on (1) pre-settled lawsuits, (2) inequities within the settlement agreements
and the probability such inequities will be accurately assessed by the court
during a fairness hearing, (3) timing problems related to the fairness hear-
ings, and (4) whether the exchanged shares may be freely tradable after-
ward without registration or exemption.  Part V explores whether the
small businesses entering into 3(a)(10) transactions may also be violating
securities laws.  Finally, Part VI discusses some of the potential actions
that could be taken in order to better reflect the legislative intent of Sec-
tion 3(a)(10) and to stop what is quickly becoming a corrupt practice. Part
VI includes two recommendations for the SEC. First, the Commission
must develop its guidance materials to include specific regulation about
this area. This guidance should comment specifically on the use of 3(a)(10)
financing schemes and whether or not, in their view, enforcement actions
will be brought during the process and their interpretation of this growing
practice. Next, the SEC should bring enforcement actions under Sections
5, 12, and 13 of the Securities Act against both the 3(a)(10) financier and
the company for violations related to the practice of 3(a)(10) financing.
Finally, it is necessary to gain congressional support to amend the Securi-
ties Act to place 3(a)(10) back into Section 4 of the 1933 Act where it was
originally written and to add language in an effort to curtail the potentially
unscrupulous practice of 3(a)(10) financing.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EARLY COMMENTARY
In order to promote disclosure,4 Section 5 of the Securities Act re-
quires that all securities5 offered or sold6 in interstate commerce must be
subject to an effective registration statement filed with the Securities and
3. See Securities Act of 1933, supra note 1.
4. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 3 (1933) (President Roosevelt emphasized the importance
of disclosure upon saying, “[t]here is . . . an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of
new securities . . . shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essen-
tially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”).
5. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1) (“The term ‘security’ means any note . . . en-
tered into on a national securities exchange relating to”).
6. Id. § 2(a)(3) (“The term ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ shall include every contract of sale or dispo-
sition of a security or interest in a security, for value.”).
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and issuers must deliver a prospectus to
investors unless the transaction is exempted by a specific provision of the
Securities Act.7 Section 3, entitled “Exempted Securities,” and Section 4,
entitled “Exempted Transactions,” provide the exemptions from registra-
tion requirements.89 As it is currently written, the 3(a)(10) exemption
exempts:
[A]ny security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide out-
standing securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange
and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and ex-
change are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and con-
ditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such
exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or
agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insur-
ance commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized by law
to grant such approval.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10). Section 3(a)(10).
The 3(a)(10) exemption is unique in that the disclosure to investors
must be deemed “fair” by an objective decision maker rather than disclos-
ing information directly to investors and letting them fend for themselves.
Congress noted that “reorganizations carried out without such judicial su-
pervision possess all the dangers implicit in the issuance of new securities
and are, therefore, not exempt from the act.”10 A year later in March of
1935, the SEC released a statement saying that the requirement of a fair-
ness hearing is “essential” to the exemption as it is the court who stands in
the place of “those who are to receive the securities or to other security
holders of the issuer, or . . . the public,” and decides whether the provi-
sions of the proposed transaction are unfair.11
The legislative history of Sections 3 and 4 indicates concern for the
reorganization of financially troubled businesses.12 Nothing in the con-
gressional debates or reports suggest an exemption of mergers and acquisi-
7. Id. § 5.
8. See id. §§ 3-4.
9. LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 709 (2d ed. 1961).
10. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 16 (1933).
11. Securities Act Release No. 312 1935 WL 29346, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 2181
(Mar. 15, 1935) (“This interpretation [that authorities who hold fairness hearings must have
express authority of law] seems necessary to give meaning to the express requirement of a
hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions, which must subsume authority in the
supervisory body to pass upon the fairness from the standpoint of the investor, as well as the
issuer and consumer, and to disapprove terms and conditions because unfair either to those
who are to receive the securities or to other security holders of the issuer, or to the public. This
requirement seems the more essential in that the whole justification for the exemption af-
forded by section 3 (a) (10) is that the examination and approval by the body in question of
the fairness of the issue in question is a substitute for the protection afforded to the investor
by the information which would otherwise be made available to him through registration.”)
(emphasis added).
12. H.R. REP. No. 85 (1933), at 6.
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tions of financially healthy companies, or for litigants who intend to use it
to distribute unregistered shares as part of a compromise settlement.13
PART II: LEFKOWITZ AND THE BIRTH OF 3(A)(10) FINANCING
Over its history, the 3(a)(10) exemption has been used for mergers,14
reorganizations of companies, and settlements of private litigation. Over
time, the SEC has issued no-action letters and guidance to interpret its
view of when the use of 3(a)(10) is appropriate.15 Further, the SEC gui-
dance seems to suggest a very broad use of the 3(a)(10) exemption based
on the following conditions16:
a. The securities must be issued in exchange for securities, claims, or
property interests; they cannot be offered for cash.
b. A court or authorized governmental entity must approve the fairness of
the terms and conditions of the exchange.
c. The reviewing court or authorized governmental entity must:
i. find, before approving the transaction, that the terms and conditions
of the exchange are fair to those to whom securities will be issued;
and
ii. be advised before the hearing that the issuer will rely on the Section
3(a)(10) exemption based on the court’s or authorized governmental
entity’s approval of the transaction.
d. The court or authorized governmental entity must hold a hearing before
approving the fairness of the terms and conditions of the transaction.
e. A governmental entity must be expressly authorized by law to hold the
hearing, although it is not necessary that the law require the hearing.
f. The fairness hearing must be open to everyone to whom securities would
be issued in the proposed exchange.
g. Adequate notice must be given to all those persons.
h. There cannot be any improper impediments to the appearance by those
persons at the hearing.
 In Lefkowitz,17 the SEC alleged that private litigation settlements using
the 3(a)(10) exemption were for “capital raising,” which was an “improper
13. 7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 § 3:2 (2d ed. 2001) (“However, the absence of legislative history has not served as an
impediment and . . . exemption’s protection has in recent years spread into these two
areas.”).
14. See e.g., E. Thom Rumberger, Jr., The Acquisition and Sale of Emerging Growth
Companies: The M&A Exit § 6:17 (2d ed. 2009).
15. Revised SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3 (CF) (November 1, 1999); See SEC Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 3A (CF) (June 18, 2008); See also No-Action, Interpretive and Exemptive
Letters, 3(a)(10)–Exemption for Exchanges After a Fairness Hearing, SECURITIES & EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction.shtml
#3a10.
16. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3A, supra note 15.
17. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Lefkowitz, Litigation Release No. 22896 2013 WL
6794148 (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23206.htm [hereinaf-
ter Lefkowitz Litigation Release].
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use” of the exemption.18 The SEC stated in its complaint that Lefkowitz
“developed an illegal strategy for penny stock issuers to pay off past due
debts while, at the same time, raising additional capital through improper
use of 3(a)(10).”19 The SEC went on to state that “the Section 3(a)(10)
exemption is not available where . . . certain terms and conditions of the
settlement are not presented to the court for consideration at a fairness
hearing; nor is the exemption available for capital raising.”20
According to the SEC, the plan began in 2004, when Unico (the com-
pany issuing the stock) issued at least seventeen convertible debentures to
Lefkowitz operated companies which allowed the companies to convert
the debentures and accrued interest in shares of common stock at fifty
percent of the closing bid price.21 If either party requested the conversion,
Unico was required to issue unrestricted shares to the debt holder, either
through a transaction pursuant to a registration statement or the applica-
tion of an exemption from registration.22 At the time, Unico was a Busi-
ness Development Company under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(“Company Act”) and, as a result, was allowed to issue securities without
filing a registration statement pursuant to the exemption from registration
provided in Regulation E of the Securities Act.23 When Unico withdrew
its status as a Business Development Company, it no longer could issue
unrestricted securities.24 Lefkowitz was left in a bind as Unico was unable
to pay back the debt or convert the debt into shares of common stock.25
Lefkowitz sought the assistance of a New York City attorney familiar
with filing registration statements for penny stock issuers to determine if
Unico could file a registration statement with the SEC in order to again
issue shares to convert the debentures.26 The law firm advised Lefkowitz
that a registration statement could take at least eighteen months to draft
and file, cost a significant amount of money, and may not be declared
effective by the SEC.27 The debentures, which were only six months in
length, would surely mature by this time.28 Lefkowitz and his counsel then
discussed the option of potentially filing lawsuits against Unico for failure
to “satisfy its obligations” and settling those lawsuits with shares issued
under the 3(a)(10) exemption.29 The law firm introduced Unico to inde-
18. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Lefkowitz, No. 8:12-
CV-1210T35MAP (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2012).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 10–11.
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 11–12.
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pendent counsel in Florida to represent Unico in “pre-settled lawsuits”
filed by Lefkowitz30 and 3(a)(10) financing was born.
In a three-year span, more than fifty pre-settled lawsuits were filed
under the pretext of settling past-due debts owed by the issuers.31 For
Unico alone less than $4 million in debt was converted into 8,921,335,034
shares, which, at the time they were issued, had a market value of
$28,331,307.22.32 The issuer would execute a settlement agreement with
the financier pursuant to an agreement to issue unrestricted common stock
to the financier at a substantial discount to the prevailing market price,
purportedly to retire the past due debt.33 The number of settlement shares
reflected in the settlement agreement was always based on a negotiated
discount of the market price and/or a multiple of the face value of the
debt, which, in turn, meant that shares had an actual market value on the
date of the settlement agreement which exceeded the amount of the past
due debt.34 Following a fairness hearing, the 3(a)(10) exemption was
granted and unrestricted shares were issued to the financier who quickly
sold the shares on the open market to public investors unaware of the
dilutive effects of the new stock issuances.35 The financier subsequently
remitted monies to the penny stock issuer that, to the SEC, made it “a
capital raising transaction.”36  On February 10, 2015, the SEC announced
it had settled its civil action against all parties “arising from their respec-
tive roles in the illegal unregistered distribution of billions of shares of
penny stocks.”37
Private actions involving companies in 3(a)(10) financing arrangements
have exemplified the continued complexities of such schemes.38 Orders
granting approval of settlements pursuant to 3(a)(10) show “purchase
agreements” of debts made by companies who then quickly file lawsuits in
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Lefkowitz, Litigation Release No. 23206, (Feb. 24, 2015)
[hereinafter Lefkowitz 23206] https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23206.htm.
38. Compare ScripsAmerica v. Ironridge Global, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
3, 2014) (ruling against a company alleging claims of securities fraud, breach of contract, and
tortious bad faith and seeking declaratory relief against a 3(a)(10) financier) with Ironridge
Global v. Green Automotive, No. BC526570 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2013) (ruling in favor of
a company that completed a settlement agreement with a 3(a)(10) financier. The court
awarded a temporary restraining order restricting the ability of the financier to convert their
outstanding debt into additional shares per the settlement agreement.  In its opposition to a
motion enforcing the shares being issued, the company (defendant) claimed that the 3(a)(10)
financier (plaintiff) first asked for forty million additional shares, then fifty five million, and
then finally six billion shares, six times the authorized capitalization of the company.).
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order to settle for shares.39 Further, many 8-K and 10-Q/K filings since
2011 describe transactions strikingly similar to Lefkowitz.40 Though the
settlement agreements have different terminologies, many have similar
terms and are completed in a similar way to Lefkowitz.41
In a basic 3(a)(10) arrangement, a 3(a)(10) financier brings a lawsuit
against the company that will be receiving the financing. Within the initial
lawsuit documents, it is stipulated that the 3(a)(10) financier is to be issued
unrestricted common stock pursuant to a reduction in price from the cur-
rent market value.42 According to the SEC filings of several companies,
millions,43 and sometimes billions,44 of shares are issued to the financier in
“tranches” which can be requested at any time by the financier as long as
the issuance is below either 4.99%45 or 9.99%.46 In press releases by com-
panies who work with 3(a)(10) financiers, it is indicated they are using the
3(a)(10) investment for “funding.”47 Further, similar to Lefkowitz, compa-
nies are issuing more value in stock than the value of the debt they origi-
nally sold to the 3(a)(10) financier.48 From start to finish, these lawsuits
39. See, e.g., Court Docket Sheet, IBC Funds LLC, v Frontier Beverage Co. Inc., No.
2014 CA 002832, (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 4, 2014) (Bloomberg Law); Court Docket Sheet, IBC
Funds LLC v. Healthy & Tasty Brands Corp., No. 2014-10463-CA-01, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 21,
2014) (Bloomberg Law).
40. See e.g., Monster Arts Inc., Corporate Filing (Form 10-K/A) (Oct. 23, 2015); Ad-
vaxis, Inc., Corporate Filing (Form 10-Q) (Sept. 11, 2015); Epazz, Inc., Corporate Filing
(Form 10-Q) (Aug. 17, 2015); Worthington Energy, Inc., Corporate Filing (Form 8-K) (Sept.
10, 2014); Jammin Java Corp., Corporate Filing (Form 8-K) (July 30, 2013); Stevia Corp.,
Corporate Filing (Form 8-K) (July 29, 2013).
41. Worthington Energy, Inc., Settlement Agreement and Stipulation (Form 8-K)
(Sept. 10, 2014); Green Automotive Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 8, 2014).
42. Worthington Energy, supra note 41.
43. Green Automotive Co., Corporate Filing (Form 8-K) (May 08, 2014) (“After the
initial issuance GAC issued a total of 27 million additional free trading shares to Ironridge
under the Stipulation formula. On or about March 28, 2014, however, Ironridge demanded
GAC issue an additional 43 million free-trading shares based on Ironridge’s calculations
under the Stipulation.”
44. Epazz, supra note 40 (“A total of 3,040,823,600 shares of Class A Common Stock
was issued, in addition to the 75,000,000 settlement shares, in complete satisfaction of the
debt. . .”).
45. Worthington Energy, supra note 41, Ex. 10.3.
46. Jammin Java Corp., Corporate Filing (Form 10-Q) (Sept. 15, 2014) (“Additionally,
as a result of each Stipulation, we agreed that at no time shall shares of common stock be
issued to Ironridge and its affiliates which would result in them owning or controlling more
than 9.99% of the Company’s outstanding common stock.”).
47. Press Release, Green Automotive Company Closes $500,000 Investment from
Ironridge Global, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 5, 2013 12:00 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/green-automotive-company-closes-500000-investment-from-ironridge-global-2013-12-
05 (“The funding will help support the company’s rollout” of new products.).
48. See ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Glob. LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1135 (C.D.
Cal. 2014).
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can be filed and settled within one to two days.49 One 3(a)(10) financier
calls this “innovative financing structure” a way to “substantially reduce
the transactional costs and time” and become a “long-term financial part-
ner, assisting public companies in financing growth and expansion by sup-
plying innovative funding solutions and flexible capital.”50
III. THE HARMS OF 3(A)(10) FINANCING
3(a)(10) financing is damaging to the companies being financed, the
shareholders who owned the stock before the transaction(s), and the mar-
ketplace as a whole. According to SEC filings, many companies engaged
in 3(a)(10) financing end up issuing between eight and forty times the orig-
inal number of shares agreed upon in the settlement.51 This flood of shares
in the market could in turn make traditional offerings more difficult as it
may cause potential future investors to have reasonable trepidations about
investing in a company whose stock price has fallen so precipitously.
The investors who already invested in the company are damaged be-
cause their investment is devalued through dilution. Investors holding
stock of a company undergoing 3(a)(10) financing will likely see a drop in
share price as a result of the number of shares entering the market due to
the financing agreement. Unless the company files an 8-K or other docu-
ment with the SEC, the investor will likely never know the 3(a)(10) settle-
ment happened until after the transaction is completed. Issuers may
intentionally withhold information from shareholders in order to keep the
stock price from falling.52 Shareholders who are notified may sell out of
their position, not because the company lacks investment potential, but
because of the overwhelming number of shares which will be sold and the
49. Court Docket Sheet, IBC Funds v. Frontier Beverage Company, Inc., No.
2014CA002832AX (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 04, 2014); Court Docket Sheet, IBC Funds LLC v.
Nustate Energy Holdings. Inc., No. 2014 CA 005303, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2014) (Bloomberg
Law).
50. IRONRIDGE, http://www.ironridgeglobal.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2015); see also
Ironridge Global Partners Attends Rodman & Renshaw, Euro Pacific Capital; see ThruE-
quity and Brean Capital Conferences in New York City, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 6, 2012
9:11AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ironridge-global-partners-llc-attends-rodman-
renshaw-euro-pacific-capital-seethruequity-and-brean-capital-conferences-in-new-york-city-
2013-09-06.
51. See, e.g., Intellicell Biosciences, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 10,
2014) (issuing 8.5 million shares originally, eventually issuing 68,766,171.); Epazz, supra note
40 (“A total of 3,040,823,600 shares of Class A Common Stock was issued, in addition to the
75,000,000 settlement shares, in complete satisfaction of the debt”); see Seaniemac Int’l, Ltd.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 26, 2014) (“On March 21 2014, IBC received 310,000
shares; 290,000 shares represented a settlement fee in accordance with Section 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Act and were valued at $0.06 per share, the March 13, 2014 closing price. Subse-
quent to March 31, 2014, an additional 6,403,900 shares were issued to IBC in full settlement
of the acquired Company liabilities”).
52. See SEC Sanctions 10 Companies for Disclosure Failures Surrounding Financing
Deals and Stock Dilution, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 5, 2014) [hereinafter SEC Sanctions]
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543368026.
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pressure on the company to create artificial fixes (like a reverse split),
which can “renew selling pressure.”53
The marketplace is damaged by 3(a)(10) financing because it artifi-
cially devalues the stock. While stock offerings normally indicate success
in a company,54 they are almost always dilutive.55 It is likely companies
accepting 3(a)(10) financing will not be able to absorb the type of dilution
of a normal secondary offering,56 let alone an offering in which the finan-
cier can ask for more shares to be issued as the stock price falls.57 Worse
yet, this gives the 3(a)(10) financiers no incentive to hold the stock as a
typical investor might. Despite receiving the stock at a discount,58 holding
the stock is less beneficial when selling the stock drops the share price and
triggers more issuances.
Bearing in mind that a rational investor would not purchase stock cer-
tain to fall in price, and considering that a company’s stock price is very
likely to fall because of the dilutive nature of 3(a)(10) financing, silence to
the market about the deal is key to a 3(a)(10) financier.  If the market
knew that the purchase of a certain company’s stock would trigger the
issuance of more shares, thus driving down the price, it is unlikely poten-
tial investors would make purchase.  Silence about a 3(a)(10) financing
agreement allows a 3(a)(10) financier to sell the stock where otherwise
there would be no buyer for their discounted shares.
IV. THE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF 3(A)(10) FINANCING
There are several potential issues presented by 3(a)(10) financing.
These issues will be discussed in the order in which a 3(a)(10) financing
agreement takes place. The 3(a)(10) financier and the target company
enter into an agreement to file a pre-settled lawsuit in order to procure a
fairness hearing.59 Judges in 3(a)(10) financing settlements typically re-
53. Reverse Stock Splits, SEC. & Exch. COMM’N (2015), http://www.sec.gov/answers/
reversesplit.htm.
54. See generally Richard Loth, Why do Share Prices Fall After a Company has a Sec-
ondary Offering?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/secondary_of
fering.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
55. See generally Rob Renaud, What is Dilutive Stock?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in-
vestopedia.com/ask/answers/06/.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
56. See Secondary Offering, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
secondaryoffering.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
57. See ScripsAmerica, Inc., v. Ironridge Global LLC, 2014 BL 314688 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
03, 2014) at 2 (describing that the settlement agreement between a 3(a)(10) financier and the
company stated that if the company’s shares fell a certain amount, they were required to
issue more shares so that it equaled the final amount of the settlement and that at any time,
the 3(a)(10) financier could request the issuance of additional shares subject to a calculation
based on the share price on the day before the court verified the fairness of the settlement.).
58. See Epazz, supra note 40.
59. ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Glob. LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1132 (C.D. Cal.
2014) (“Because the shares were unregistered, Ironridge and Scrips had to obtain court ap-
proval under California and federal securities laws before a transfer of the stock could take
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ceive a complaint, a list of the claims for which the 3(a)(10) financier bases
the lawsuit, an answer, and sometimes a “Memorandum of Law.”60 The
settlement agreement typically allows the 3(a)(10) financier to request
more discounted shares of stock as the price goes down and contains an
“adjustment mechanism” to determine the exact amount.61 In a timeframe
as short as one to two days, the judge pronounces the settlement transac-
tion agreement “fair” to those who will be receiving the securities (the
3(a)(10) financier).62 After the agreement, the 3(a)(10) financier sells the
securities in the open market, thus diluting the current shareholders
value.63
A. Pre-Settled Lawsuits
In Lefkowitz, the SEC accused a financier of settling lawsuits “under
the pretext” of settling past-due debts, but in actuality the shares ex-
changed were in “pre-settled” lawsuits.64 In other words, the exchange of
equity for debt relief (the “transaction”) was already settled before the
3(a)(10) financier filed the lawsuit against the company. It stretches the
bounds of gullibility to believe the financiers in such transactions are not
filing the lawsuits for the sole purpose of meeting 3(a)(10)’s requirement
that the transaction must be for a “bona fide” claim.65 While it seems that
any justiciable allegation will suffice,66 there was at least one instance in
which the SEC did not provide no-action protection in a 3(a)(10) settle-
ment because the issued securities pertained to a future contract that had
not taken place yet.67 To the SEC, it appeared as though the company had
simply signed a bad, more expensive than bargained for, contract and was
attempting to use 3(a)(10) to finance the deal.68  The SEC later said they
would not recommend action in regards to the exchange after the com-
pany corrected its facts to state that the contract had already caused the
company to “default.”69  It can be inferred that while the definition is very
place. Thus, on October 11, 2013, Ironridge filed a breach of contract complaint in Los Ange-
les Superior Court that sought to collect the accounts payable debts; it sued as the successor
in interest to Scrips’ creditors under receivables purchase agreements into which it had en-
tered with the creditors.”).
60. Memorandum of Law, IBC Funds LLC v. Healthy & Tasty Brands Corp., No.
2014-010463-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2014) (Bloomberg Law).
61. See ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Global LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1132 (C.D.
Cal. 2014).
62. Hicks, supra note 13, § 3:1.
63. See generally SEC Sanctions, supra note 52.
64. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 18, at 2.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(10) (2012);
66. HICKS, supra note 13, at § 3:9 (“Presumably, any justiciable allegation will suffice
as long as it relates to an actual injury and thus to an outstanding claim.”).
67. Carex Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9531 (Sept. 10, 1975).
68. Id.
69. Carex Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 11284 (Oct. 30, 1975).
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broad, the “bona fide” debts required by 3(a)(10), must have caused the
sort of financial stress 3(a)(10) was written to relieve.70 A court may find,
in line with the legislative intent, that a claim may not be bona fide if the
company would not default but for the 3(a)(10) settlement.
Negotiations between the parties before the settlement, indeed before
the assignment of the claims, may cut against the fairness requirement of
3(a)(10). Both the SEC and the courts have mostly avoided a definition of
“fairness.”71 In discussing the factors to include in “fairness,” the court in
Blinder took judicial notice of the “adversarial” proceeding stating that
“[t]here is nothing to suggest any collusion in the preparation and submis-
sion of the agreement.”72 In quoting Blinder, other courts have mentioned
how “hotly contested” the settlement agreement was and how “the parties
could not even agree on who should participate in the settlement negotia-
tions” when deciding whether it was fair.73 This is in stark contrast to a
3(a)(10) financing settlement in which the parties are almost never adver-
sarial, let alone at odds; the settlement is introduced by the financier to the
target company as a banker pitches a loan.74 The target company agrees
before the debt is even assigned to the 3(a)(10) financier.75 The financier’s
“complaint” and the company’s “answer” are then manufactured for the
fairness hearing.76
At least one court has stated that it is “clear that Section 3(a)(10) does
not provide a mechanism for obtaining a fairness hearing.”77 The “author-
ity must come from somewhere” and the court has inherent authority to
70. Securities Act Release No. 312, supra note 11 (stating that the “whole justifica-
tion” for § 3(a)(10) was that “the examination and approval by the body in question of the
fairness of the issue in question is a substitute for the protection afforded to the investor by
the information which would otherwise be made available to him through registration.”).
71. Bruce Matson, Fairness Requirement in Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of
1933, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 555 (1982) (“Focusing upon these requirements, the
cases, releases, and no-action letters merely reiterated the statutory language of the exemp-
tion and have avoided a discussion of what constitutes fairness in a section 3(a)(10) exchange
transaction.”).
72. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo.
1981) (“To the contrary, it is apparent that these attorneys have represented the interests of
their clients aggressively throughout this case; that the settlement is the product of arms-
length bargaining; and that their recommendation that this court accept this agreed resolu-
tion of the disputed issues results from their exercise of professional judgment as to what is in
the best interests of those for whom they appeared.”).
73. S.E.C. v. Founding Partners Capital Mgmt., 2:09-CV-229-FTM-29, 2014 WL
2993780, at *13 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2014).
74. Dan Lonkevich, Ironridge Breathes Life Into Debt Exchanges, DEAL PIPELINE
(Apr. 25, 2014), http://ironridgeglobal.com/newsroom/Ironridge-Breathes-LIFE.pdf (“We
call the other side to see if it’s workable. . .We only do consensual deals.  We’re the Warren
Buffet of microcap financing.”).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Macleod-Stedman, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 449, 467 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
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approve a “settlement of litigation.”78 The court found that it was appro-
priate to rule on the fairness of the settlement because 3(a)(10) “was in-
tended primarily to offer financially troubled corporations an alternative
to the burdens of registration.”79 In 3(a)(10) financing, the company was
not looking to avoid the “burdens of registration,” but rather was offered
an opportunity to alleviate some of its debt by paying off its creditors with
its own equity shares.80
B. Settlement Agreement
Even if the settlement agreement is provided to the court81 it may still
not provide everything the judge needs to make a decision. For instance, in
Lefkowitz, the SEC found that the 3(a)(10) financier was intentionally
leaving out the “true value” of the settlement agreement and a side agree-
ment to remit gains from the sale of the stock back to the company.82 At
no point was the presiding judge made aware of the “market value of the
settlement shares,” much less that the market value of those shares “ex-
ceeded the debt being extinguished by multiples.”83 While the court is
shown to be aware of the total amount of the claims (through purchase
agreements submitted to the court), the court is often not made aware of
the value of the shares or the calculation by which they are further distrib-
uted after the date of the settlement.84 As one court put it, “the reviewing
court ‘must have sufficient information before it to determine the value of
both the securities, claims or interests to be surrendered and the securities
to be issued in the proposed transaction.’”85  When reviewing the terms of
a 3(a)(10) financing settlement agreement, it is not possible for a judge (or
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See e.g., IBC Funds, LLC v. Entertainment Arts Research, Inc., No. 2014-CA-
3839-NC (12th Cir. Jul. 25, 2014).
82. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 18, at 24.
83. See id. at 34.
84. See Lefkowitz Litigation Release, supra note 17.
85. Brio Capital, LP v. Sanswire Corp., 2013 BL 130496, at *2 (S. Ct. May 9, 2013) (“In
determining the fairness of a settlement involving issuance of exempt shares under the Secur-
ities Act, the totality of the circumstances should be considered. According to the SEC Staff
Bulletin, the court must make an affirmative finding that the exchange is fair to the share-
holders (SEC Staff Bulletin § 4[B][1]), and the reviewing court “must have sufficient infor-
mation before it to determine the value of both the securities, claims or interests to be
surrendered and the securities to be issued in the proposed transaction.” (Id., § 4[B][2] [inter-
nal quotation marks and footnote omitted]; see Matter of Board of Directors of Multicanal
S.A., 340 BR 154, 168 [SD NY 2006] [describing the SEC Staff Bulletin as “[t]he most au-
thoritative description of the requirements of§ 3[a][10].”].) In making such findings, factors
to be considered include the extensiveness of the litigation to date, the likelihood of success
on the merits of the claims and defenses, the availability of public information about the
financial condition of the defendant, the ability to precisely value the stock at issue, and the
costs of ongoing litigation. (See Matter of TradePartners, Inc. Investor Litigation, 2008 WL
4911797 [WD Mich 2008]; Continental Assurance Co., 694 F Supp 449 [ND Ill 1988].).”).
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state agency) to determine the total number of shares or their value be-
cause 3(a)(10) financiers are able to request a nearly infinite amount of
shares as the share price continues to fall.
C. Time Issues
Even if it were possible for all relevant and useful information to be
included in a 3(a)(10) financing settlement agreement, there would still be
a question as to the ability of judges in these fairness hearings to properly
understand the transaction at hand. It is important to remember that this
process is meant to take the place of traditional registration, a process that
can take many months.86 In a 3(a)(10) financing hearing, the court can
receive the complaint, the proposed settlement agreement, and the debt
claim purchase agreements and approve the settlement agreement in as
little as one to two days.87
Further, some courts in which 3(a)(10) financing hearings often take
place hold a “five minute motion calendar,” which requires that attorneys
make a good faith effort to resolve the issue within five minutes.88 It has
been implied that a statutory analysis shows that this sort of use of
3(a)(10) is improper—that a fairness hearing should go beyond “procedu-
ral fairness”—because the 3(a)(10) exemption requires a judicial determi-
nation of fairness to assure investor protection.89 It is extraordinarily
unlikely that a court receiving a complaint, answer, and sixty-seven page
claim purchase agreement, is able to resolve whether or not the deal is fair
(in one or two days) with the same level of scrutiny as would be achieved
with registration statements filed with the SEC.90 In order to properly pro-
tect companies and shareholders, a court must look over all material docu-
ments and be able to address any issues therein. Two days to review what
can be hundreds of pages of documents and a five-minute hearing simply
cannot provide the same level of protection as traditional SEC
registration.
86. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 18, at 11.
87. Notice of Hearing, IBC Funds LLC v. Healthy & Tasty Brands Corp., No. 2014-
010463-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 30, 2014) (Bloomberg Law).
88. Id. (“The undersigned attorney certifies that a good faith effort to resolve the mat-
ter was made prior to scheduling the hearing and that the issues can be resolved within the
court’s 5 minute motion calendar.”).
89. In re Bd. of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 340 B.R. 154, 171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006).
90. Court Docket Sheet, IBC Funds LLC. V. Nustate Energy Holdings Inc., No.
2014CA005303AX, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 09, 2014) (Bloomberg Law).
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D. Are 3(a)(10) Settlement Shares Able to be Freely Traded After a
Fairness Hearing Approved the Settlement Agreement?
In a transaction that avoids Section 5 disclosures by relying on the
3(a)(10) exemption, there must be an exchange of a bona fide security.91
In 1934, Section 3(a)(10) was pulled from Section 4 and placed under Sec-
tion 3 in what has been coined a “legislative accident” as Section 3 deals
with securities exemptions and Section 4 deals with exemptions of transac-
tions.92 This may be seen as a distinction without a difference, but it
speaks to a very serious question as to whether the securities may be freely
resold after the transfer. Just two years after the 1934 Act passed, Con-
gress remarked that “[b]y placing these exemptions under section 3 it is
made clear that securities entitled to exemption on original issuance retain
their exemption; if the issuer is not obliged to register in order to make the
original distribution, dealers within a year are subject to no restriction
against dealing in the securities.”93 (emphasis added).
In the past the SEC has been inconsistent regarding its position on a
financier’s ability to resell 3(a)(10) settlement shares. The Commission has
issued competing no-action letters: (1) not allowing resale by non-affiliates
unless they relied on a separate exemption and did not receive “substan-
tial” shares,94 (2) declaring that subsequent resale could only be “affectu-
ated pursuant to registration under the Act or suitable exemption”95 and,
(3) most recently, allowing the shares to be resold by the party receiving
91. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(10) (2012) (noting that a bona
fide security exchange is any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide
outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for
cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved.).
92. See LOSS, supra note 9.
93. Letters of Gen. Counsel Discussing Application of Section 3(a)(9), SEC Interpre-
tive Letter, Securities Act Release No. 646, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,956 (Feb. 3, 1936) (emphasis
added); see also H. R. REP. NO. 1838, at 40, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.(1934) 40. See also 15 U.S.C.
77b(a)(12) (“The result is in line with the Commission’s interpretation of the act as it stood
before, but the amendment removes all doubt as to its correctness.”); 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(12));
(“The term ‘dealer’ means any person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly
or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person.”).
94. Koracorp Industries, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12581 (Aug. 22, 1976)
(“With respect to any public resales of the shares received upon distribution, we will not raise
any question if persons who are not affiliates of Koracorp and who do not receive a substan-
tial portion of the shares distributed pursuant to the settlement resell their shares in reliance
upon the exemption from registration provided by Section 4(1) of the Act.”).
95. Weatherford Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12594 (Aug. 13 1976)
(“While the exemption provided by Section 3(a)(10) of the Act may be available for shares
issued in settlement of a claim where the fairness of the settlement has been approved by a
Court, it is our view that the transactional exemption provided by that section does not ex-
tend to subsequent resales of the securities acquired. Such resales can only be effectuated
pursuant to registration under the Act or suitable exemption.” Further, even when a subse-
quent exemption for resale is provide by Section 4(1), the “rationale” of the act should be
“interpreted to permit only routine trading transactions as distinguished from distributions.
Therefore, a person reselling securities under Section 4(1) of the Act must sell the securities
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the shares if they were a non-affiliate because the presumptive under-
writer rule was amended.96 Consistently, however, the SEC has advised
that non-affiliates receiving shares could resell them as long as they did
not receive a “significant number” of shares.97 By any reasonable stan-
dard, 3(a)(10) financiers are receiving a significant number of shares.98
Most courts have found that there needs to be a separate registration
or exemption in order to resell 3(a)(10) securities. In Multicanal the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy court analyzed, and eventually remanded to a lower
court, the question of whether a section 4(2) exemption was needed to be
able to sell the securities received freely after the exchange.99 In Continen-
tal Insurance the court found that “since the statute is designed [for]. . .an
unsettled dispute” the court can exercise its jurisdiction to provide a fair-
ness hearing.100 However, the court “does not believe it to be appropriate
in such limited quantities and in such a manner so as not to disrupt the trading markets.”);
Carex Int’l Inc., 1975 WL 11283, at *2 (July 7, 1975).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 230, 239 (2008); The amendments to Rule 145, among other things,
eliminated the presumptive underwriter provision in Rule 145(c). The SLB states that, be-
cause securities received in a Rule 145(a) transaction that was exempt under Section 3(a)(10)
would not constitute “restricted securities” within the meaning of Rule 144(a)(3), those se-
curities may generally be resold without regard to Rule 144 if the sellers are not affiliates of
the issuer and have not been affiliates within 90 days of the date of the transaction. In the
event that the securities are held by affiliates of the issuer, those holders may be able to resell
the securities in accordance with Rule 144. Accordingly, the shares issued in accordance with
above judgment are free trading as set forth above. Comment Letter from Compliance Sys-
tems Corp to the SEC Staff (Jan. 22, 2013).
97. A recipient of Section 3(a)(10) settlement securities that were not restricted was
advised that immediate resale under Section 4(1) was permissible so long as that person (1)
was not an affiliate and (2) did not receive a “substantial amount” of securities in relation to
the amount of securities issued in the settlement. See, e.g., General Pub. Utils. Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28493 (June 29, 1983); The SEC staff consistently refused to
express any view as to what constituted a substantial amount of securities in a nonaffiliate’s
hands, “since the issuer and its counsel are in the best position to ascertain the facts and
make the requisite determination.” April Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 14073
(Feb. 18, 1977); see also International Tel. & Tel. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL
10567 (June 17, 1977); Delhi Int’l Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 10620 (Feb. 25,
1977); WILLIAM J. HICKS, 7 EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
§ 3:84 n. 3 (Clark Boardman Co., 7th ed. 1979).
98. See IronRidge Global LTD v Green Automotive Co., Docket No. BC526570 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Nov. 01, 2013) (requesting for the shares, the 3(a)(10) financier wrote the defen-
dant, “[b]ased on the stock drop [after our initial issuance], you now owe over 6 billion (with
a Carl Sagan ‘b’) shares.”).
99. In re Bd. of Directors of Multicanal, S.A., 340 B.R. 154, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006) (“On remand, Multicanal argues that an exemption under § 3(a)(10) is available and
that the record is sufficient to include the fairness finding required by that provision. Multi-
canal also contends that since the securities to be issued to the U.S. retail holders will be
covered by the Registration Statement and the securities issued to the ‘yes’ voting notehold-
ers will be covered by Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), there will
be no discrimination, and all of the issued securities will be fungible and freely tradable.”).
100. Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Macleod-Stedman, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 449, 467 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
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to hold that the new securities are not subject to registration.”101 By its
reading, the court found that the only requirement of a fairness hearing is
that the court approve the “terms and conditions of the exchange,” but
“an express determination as to the necessity for the registration is more
appropriately left to the SEC or any future disputes that may result from
the exchange of securities.”102  Most recently, five different defendants in
connection to the 3(a)(10) financing scheme in Lefkowitz, were all found
to be in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, which requires
public distributions of securities to be conducted pursuant to an effective
registration statement filed with the Commission or pursuant to a valid
and properly invoked exemption from registration.103
Most academics are in favor of requiring additional registration or ex-
emptions for resale. The 3(a)(10) exemption is “not based on the nature of
the security” and operates “more like a transaction exemption.”104  More
than that, “the weight of authority leaves no doubt that 3(a)(10) is and
should be a transactional exemption only.”105 The main reason is that the
fairness hearing may protect the initial investors who receive the shares,
but it does not provide assurance to the secondary purchasers like the pro-
tection afforded by a prospectus.106
The SEC itself has argued that 3(a)(10) financing companies are actu-
ally unregistered dealers and are therefore in violation of Section 15(a)(1)
of the Exchange Act.107  A “dealer” is someone who is “engaged in the
business of buying and selling securities. . .for a person’s own account
through a broker or otherwise.”108  While the issue has not been fully ad-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Lefkowitz 23206, supra note 37.
104. Thomas Lee Hazen, EXEMPTIONS FROM THE SECURITIES ACT REGISTRATION RE-
QUIREMENTS – GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 51-52 (2007), http://files.ali-aba.org/files/course
books/pdf/CM052_chapter_06.pdf (“Sections 3(a)(9), 3(a)(10), 3(a)(11), 3(b), 3(c) all operate
more like transaction exemptions—i.e. the exemption is not based on the nature of the secur-
ity being issued and thus does not apply to every transaction in those securities. For example,
downstream resales may need a new exemption or else face registration. . . Section 4 identi-
fies transactions which are exempt from registration. Thus, the crucial issue is the structure of
the transaction in which the securities are issued . . . In 1996, Congress added section 28 of
the Securities Act which gives the SEC broad exemptive power not tied to specific types of
securities or transactions . . . Under this provision, the Commission may adopt rules or regu-
lations conditionally or unconditionally exempting any person (or class of persons), any se-
curity (or class of securities) or any transaction (or class of transactions) “to the extent that
such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the
protection of investors. . . Scope of the exemptions—sections 3, 4, and 28 of the Securities
Act are exemptions from registration. They are not exemptions from the antifraud
provisions.”).
105. Ash, Reorganizations and Other Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 75 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 26 (1980).
106. See id. at 26–27.
107. See IronRidge Global Partners, Administrative Proceedings Rulings Release No.
3298 (ALJ Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/alj//2015/ap-3298.pdf.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A) (2012).
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judicated, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did find that there were
material facts that are in dispute to overcome a motion for summary dis-
position.109 The case turned on whether the 3(a)(10) financier’s buying
and selling of securities was done as part of regular business.110  The ALJ
found that the definition of dealer “cast a wide net,” and that a 3(a)(10)
financier could fall under that definition based on the “totality” of a “fact-
specific endeavor.”111
V. THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE? HOW MUCH BLAME SHOULD
APPROPRIATELY BE PLACED ON THE TARGET COMPANY?
The companies accepting 3(a)(10) financing are taking a big risk. In
order to keep current investors apprised of significant corporate events,
public companies are required to file a Form 8-K within four business days
of a “triggering event.”112 A 3(a)(10) financing scenario can be a trigger-
ing event, and there are two items under Form 8-K that must be reported
to investors in such a situation: item 1.01 and item 3.02.113 Under item
1.01, a registrant must disclose within four business days its entry into a
material definitive agreement.114 Under item 3.02, a smaller reporting
company115 must disclose a sale of unregistered securities, within four bus-
iness days of the sale, unless the securities constitute less than five percent
of the shares outstanding in that particular class of securities.116
According to the SEC, this does not mean five percent at the date of
the settlement, but every time the company issues five percent or more in
any tranche.117 In 2014, the SEC filed cease and desist orders against ten
companies for a combined twenty two unregistered stock sales of over five
percent of total issued and outstanding stock and other violations under
Exchange Act rules 13(a) and 12(b).118 The timeline in the cease and de-
sist orders show that the 3(a)(10) financing companies forced the compa-
109. IronRidge Global Partners, supra note 107.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id.
112. Form 8-K, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Changeover to the SEC’s New Smaller Reporting Company System, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/smrepcosysguid.pdf (qualify-
ing as “smaller reporting companies, “. . .if they (1) have a common equity public float of less
than $75 million or (2) are unable to calculate their public float and have annual revenue of
$50 million or less, upon entering the system”).
116. Id.
117. SEC Sanctions, supra note 52.
118. See id. (“According to the orders, the companies entered in a financing agreement
pursuant to which [the company] issued shares of stock to the financing company purportedly
in reliance on a registration exemption found in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of
1933. The financing agreement provided for obligations that were material and enforceable
against [the company].”).
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nies to sell between 5% and over 35,000% of their outstanding stock over
a period ranging from as little as one week up to several months.119
In Lefkowitz, the SEC found it compelling that the agreement between
the 3(a)(10) financier and the target company was pre-settled.  Any time
there are two apparent adversaries entering into an agreement, there is an
opportunity for fraud.  Indeed, beyond not properly keeping investors in-
formed about the 3(a)10) transactions, they were also giving kickbacks to
the target company after completing the deal.120 Criminal charges were
filed against the target company for making “false and fictitious state-
ments” in the company’s filings with the SEC regarding the 3(a)(10)
transactions.121
VI. SOLUTIONS TO ALLOW 3(A)(10) FINANCING
While it has been suggested further safeguards are not necessary in
3(a)(10) transactions because fairness hearings are a good substitute for
the registration process,122 the evidence presented in previous sections in-
dicates a need for additional safeguards to protect the system from
3(a)(10) financing. 3(a)(10) financing clearly does not benefit the target
company, the investors holding securities in the target company before the
3(a)(10) transaction, or the market as a whole. For these reasons, the SEC
needs to step in to protect investors.
The SEC needs to bring enforcement actions against 3(a)(10) financing
companies.123 3(a)(10) financiers bring pre-settled lawsuits against compa-
nies in order to have a fairness hearing where normally the lawsuits re-
119. See id. (noting that in one cease and desist order, a company had been forced to
sell over seven billon unregistered shares of common stock. The company failed to report the
extreme nature of the dilution to shareholders for a little over a month. During this time
(according to http://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/COWI/) the company’s share price fell from
a high of $.001 to $.0001, a 1000% percent fall, from which it had not recovered as of Nov. 6,
2015).
120. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 18, at 17.
121. See U.S. v. Unico, Inc., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, No. 3:13-CR-00355-
BTM (S.D. Cal., Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Unico_
Inc_DPA.pdf.
122. Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the
Task Force on Integration by the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, 41 BUS. LAW.
595, 636 (1985 - 1986). (“During the past fifty years, many changes in the securities laws have
augmented investor protection in a number of ways. As a result, the registration process has
become less important in the overall pattern of investor protection, diminishing the necessity
of an interpretive policy favoring registration. In view of these developments, we believe that
as a matter of policy there should also be integration safe harbors for offerings made in
reliance on section 3(a)(9) or section 3(a)(10) of the Act, since, in such offerings, there is
little need for the registration safeguards.”).
123. Ironridge Global Partners, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 75272
(June 23, 2015). (“This year, the SEC brought its first enforcement action against the 3(a)(10)
financier ordering it to cease and desist for willful violations of Sections 15(a) and 20(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It claimed, as I have here, that 3(a)(10) financiers are
actually unregistered dealers.”).
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lated to these claims would be brought as part of the dispute between the
parties. These suits are brought simply to use the court to transfer shares
without the normal scrutiny of the registration process.124 A company is
perfectly able to purchase unpaid debt contracts and enforce agreements
in other ways, but 3(a)(10) financiers are purchasing the debt only after
first working out a deal for reduced-price shares. If the two companies had
the ability to trade outstanding debt for shares without the courts, they
probably would. 3(a)(10), however, is not intended to help companies
raise capital using a fairness hearing; 3(a)(10) is intended to give those
with a prior dispute an opportunity to settle by exchanging shares for bona
fide claims.125 Current 3(a)(10) transactions are in direct opposition to the
legislative intent of 3(a)(10) and should be seen as outside of the 2008
SEC guidance on the appropriate use of Section 3(a)(10).126
The judges conducting fairness hearings only review the settlement
documents for a short period of time (as little as one to two days) before
the hearing, and in some cases require the hearing to be held in five min-
utes or less.127 This brings into question whether the judges conduct a
“fairness” hearing at all given the courts’ interpretation of what the enu-
merated fairness elements should be.128 Even if they did have time, the
judges are left without material information, such as the market value of
the shares the 3(a)(10) financier will receive.
Although unlikely, if the 3(a)(10) financier could provide the market
value of the initial shares proposed in exchange for the outstanding claims,
this would not satisfy 3(a)(10)’s requirement that the exchange be for
“bona fide” outstanding securities because the financier most likely in-
cluded a clause in the pre-settled agreement that allows them to take the
shares at a discounted price, sell them freely, and collect more shares as
the share price of the target company falls. But even if the securities and
the hypothetical future securities were deemed “bona fide” within the lan-
guage of Section 3(a)(10), a judge could find that while the fairness of the
initial disbursement of shares was sound, the additional issuances of shares
124. Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Macleod-Stedman, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 449, 467 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (“It is clear that § 3(a)(10) does not provide a mechanism for obtaining a fairness
hearing. It is not a jurisdictional or procedural statute. Authority for the hearing must come
from elsewhere. This court has the inherent authority to approve a settlement of litigation.
Also, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, this court has the authority to rule on the issue
before it in this case or controversy. There is no jurisdictional problem, it is only a prudential
problem of whether this is an appropriate case in which to act. Section 3(a)(10) was intended
primarily to offer financially troubled corporations an alternative to the burdens of registra-
tion. Hicks § 3.02; Ash, Reorganizations and Other Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1980).”).
125. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 18, at 10.
126. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3A, supra note 16.
127. See Court Docket Sheet, IBC Funds LLC. v. Nustate Energy Holdings Inc., No.
2014CA005303AX (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 09, 2014) (Bloomberg Law); see also Notice of Hearing,
supra note 87.
128. See In re Bd. of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 340 B.R. 154, 169-72 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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exchanged for debt, are not being exchanged after a fairness hearing and
are therefore not freely tradable as the shares are unregistered and have
not met the requirements of the exemptions of the Securities Act.
At a minimum, the SEC needs to make its guidelines more clear as to
the requirements and expectations of all parties involved in 3(a)(10) fi-
nancing. First, the SEC needs to officially adopt the fairness standards set
forth in the case law. The court should be required to analyze: (i) the rec-
ommendations of counsel; (ii) the scope of the record as an indication of
the adequacy of the investigation into the facts; (iii) the apparent alterna-
tives to settlement; (iv) the nature and volume of responses from those
receiving notice of the hearing; (v) the opportunity for direct participation
in the process of obtaining full disclosure;129 (vi) the liquidation value of
the business before and after the proposed settlement; (vii) whether the
settlement was of fair value; and (viii) whether the settlement was reached
after fair dealing.130 These factors will require the courts to look deeply
into 3(a)(10) transactions and ferret out potential issues.
Next, the guidelines should speak specifically to whether shares may be
taken by the financier after the date of the settlement and how many
shares is “significant” enough to trigger the SEC’s own previous guidance.
Based on the 2004 Form 8-K disclosure changes requiring a company to
publicly disclose when they sell unregistered shares above five percent of
their outstanding shares,131 a heightened disclosure requirement for
3(a)(10) financing companies should be implemented. If a 3(a)(10) finan-
cier were to receive more than five percent of the total outstanding shares
of a company in exchange for recently purchased claims, the SEC should
require that the market be made aware of the transaction, its details, the
parties involved, and the potential impact to the share value before the
unregistered shares are deemed exempt under Section 3(a)(10).  In order
to further the SEC’s mission of open markets and informed investors, the
financier and the issuer should be jointly responsible for informing the
market.132
Finally, there should be congressional support to amend Section
3(a)(10). First, the exemption should be placed back in Section 4 as a
transactional, rather than a security based exemption. The “legislative ac-
cident”133 of moving 3(a)(10) out of Section 4 caused confusion about
129. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blinder Robinson & Co., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D.
Colo. 1981).
130. In re Bd. of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 340 B.R. 154, 170 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006).
131. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–230, 239–240, 249 (2004).
132. See Regulation 13D-G, Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.ecfr.gov/
cgi-bin/text-idx?node=pt17.4.240&rgn=div5#sg17.4.240_113b2_62.sg29 details about the
transaction if they have not already).
133. See LOSS, supra note 9.
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whether it was a securities or transaction based exemption.134 Second,
3(a)(10) should be barred from use in situations where investors do not
know the total number of potential shares that could be diluting their in-
vestment. This would mean, at minimum, reporting the maximum number
of shares that could be exchanged in a given 3(a)(10) transaction as well as
the equation used to derive that total. Also, any amendment to Section
3(a)(10) should bar provisions in a settlement agreement that would allow
companies to issue additional shares to the financier without current
shareholders’ knowledge. This can be done one of two ways. First, require
the issuing company in a 3(a)(10) transaction to notify all current share-
holders of the judgment. This will serve a similar purpose as a registration
statement and will notify shareholders of the potential dilution that could
occur while they wait for a Form 8-K filing with the SEC. Second, the
language of Section 3(a)(10) could simply state that the judge or agency
needs to find the settlement terms and conditions fair to all parties in-
volved, rather than just the party receiving the securities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act is meant to allow companies in
dire straits a way to make good on their outstanding claims by issuing
shares in exchange for bona fide outstanding claims. The investors,
3(a)(10) financiers in this context, are protected by means of a judge or
agency reviewing the terms and conditions of the exchange to make sure
they are fair to the investors receiving the shares of a struggling company.
3(a)(10) financing, which is a practice where the investor actively looks for
companies who would like to trade its debt for discounted shares, results
in the possibility of a financier receiving an almost infinite number of
shares if the stock price falls. This practice not only falls outside of the
legislative intent of Section 3(a)(10), but also leads to violations of Sec-
tions 5, 12, and 13 of the Securities Act of 1933. Rule makers must focus
on this growing practice to blatantly skirt the traditional registration pro-
cess of the Securities Act and amend Section 3(a)(10) to better protect
current shareholders of the target comp any, the target company itself, and
the marketplace from the harmful effects of 3(a)(10) financing.
134. See id. at 709 (noting that a proposal to amend the Securities Act by moving
3(a)(10) and others back into Section 4 was attempted in 1941 and again in 1959, but the
proposals were eventually dropped for substitute bills).
